补贴
农业
困境
业务
政府(语言学)
产业组织
进化博弈论
收入
颠覆性创新
基石
创新管理
环境经济学
博弈论
经济
自然资源经济学
营销
微观经济学
市场经济
生态学
哲学
艺术
会计
视觉艺术
认识论
生物
语言学
作者
Jianli Luo,Mingjun Hu,Minmin Huang,Yanhu Bai
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.135564
摘要
Low-carbon agriculture is a crucial component of sustainable development; technological innovation is the cornerstone of the agricultural transformation towards low-carbon production. This study developed a tripartite evolutionary game model for agricultural enterprise, university, and the government. It examined the low-carbon technology innovation of the agricultural innovation from an innovation consortium’s perspective, considering the dilemma that China’s low-carbon agriculture development faces owing to the lack of a single subject’s innovation capability. The simulation’s outcomes indicated: (1) The increase in collaborative innovation revenue, default costs (three–six times), and additional social benefits of collaborative innovation effectively promoted the evolutionary game results to (1,1,1), which means agricultural enterprises and universities choose collaborative innovation, and the government chooses to provide subsidies; (2) Enhancing innovation subsidies influenced game outcomes to a certain degree, but the effect was limited. The findings provide theoretical basis for government to enact policies to promote scientific and technological progress and to develop low-carbon agriculture.
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