Signalling compliance: an explanation of the intermittent green policy implementation gap in China

The existence of the green policy implementation gap in China has aroused widespread concern, and is frequently explained with officials’ characteristics, problematic institutions, and citizens’ participation. However, few studies have noticed the intermittence of the gap. By coding six media signals and 394 documents issued by the central government (2000–2015) from 27 items in dimensions of credibility/reliability, intensity, and clarity according to the signalling theory, causes of the intermittence were explored. I found that central signals are the driving force. Document signals work better than media signals, particularly in Hu Jintao’s era. Documents’ credible commitments, threats, legal effects, issuing departments, wording intensity, clear definition of departments and society’s responsibilities, and regulation targets can significantly stimulate local governments’ environmental regulation behaviours, especially in eastern China. In Xi Jinping’s era, credible commitments and environmental campaigns’ impacts are higher. The paper demonstrates how, where and when China’s model of environmental authoritarianism is effective.