Introduction to Game Theory

Chapter 2 Introduction to Game Theory Fei Fang, Fei Fang School of Computer Science and Institute for Software Research, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USASearch for more papers by this authorShutian Liu, Shutian Liu Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, NYU Tandon School of Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn, NY, USASearch for more papers by this authorAnjon Basak, Anjon Basak Network Security Branch, Combat Capabilities Development Command, US Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, MD, USASearch for more papers by this authorQuanyan Zhu, Quanyan Zhu Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, NYU Tandon School of Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn, NY, USASearch for more papers by this authorChristopher D. Kiekintveld, Christopher D. Kiekintveld Department of Computer Science, The University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX, USASearch for more papers by this authorCharles A. Kamhoua, Charles A. Kamhoua Network Security Branch, Combat Capabilities Development Command, US Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, MD, USASearch for more papers by this author Fei Fang, Fei Fang School of Computer Science and Institute for Software Research, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USASearch for more papers by this authorShutian Liu, Shutian Liu Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, NYU Tandon School of Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn, NY, USASearch for more papers by this authorAnjon Basak, Anjon Basak Network Security Branch, Combat Capabilities Development Command, US Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, MD, USASearch for more papers by this authorQuanyan Zhu, Quanyan Zhu Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, NYU Tandon School of Engineering, New York University, Brooklyn, NY, USASearch for more papers by this authorChristopher D. Kiekintveld, Christopher D. Kiekintveld Department of Computer Science, The University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, TX, USASearch for more papers by this authorCharles A. Kamhoua, Charles A. Kamhoua Network Security Branch, Combat Capabilities Development Command, US Army Research Laboratory, Adelphi, MD, USASearch for more papers by this author Book Editor(s):Charles A Kamhoua, Charles A KamhouaSearch for more papers by this authorChristopher D Kiekintveld, Christopher D KiekintveldSearch for more papers by this authorFei Fang, Fei FangSearch for more papers by this authorQuanyan Zhu, Quanyan ZhuSearch for more papers by this author First published: 12 September 2021 https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119723950.ch2 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Summary Game theory mathematically models strategic interaction among intelligent decision-makers. It has wide applications in economics, sociology, psychology, political science, biology, and as we will introduce later in this book, cybersecurity. To facilitate the readers, we present the basics of game theory in this chapter. We will start by introducing two-player zero-sum normal-form games, the basic class of games that involve two decision-makers who will each make a single move at the same time, and get a payoff, with the two players' payoffs summing up to zero. We will then introduce the solution concepts in normal-form games, including the most well-known Nash equilibrium concept. We further introduce the extensive-form games, which are more complicated and more expressive than normal-form games. They explicitly represent the sequencing of players' moves and the information each player has about the other players' moves when they make a decision. We will then introduce Stackelberg games and Stackelberg security games, a subclass of games with wide applications in security domains. We will also introduce repeated games where the players repeatedly play the same game. Finally, we will add Bayesian games that depict the uncertainty in players' types and payoff and stochastic games that capture the dynamic transition from one game to another. These models and concepts will be used frequently in later chapters. Game Theory and Machine Learning for Cyber Security RelatedInformation