竞争对手分析
经济
波动性(金融)
微观经济学
竞赛(生物学)
不完全竞争
投资策略
战略互补
投资(军事)
业务
不完美的
产业组织
金融经济学
哲学
政治
生物
语言学
生态学
利润(经济学)
管理
法学
政治学
作者
Nalin Kulatilaka,Enrico Perotti
出处
期刊:Management Science
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:1998-08-01
卷期号:44 (8): 1021-1031
被引量:656
标识
DOI:10.1287/mnsc.44.8.1021
摘要
We provide a strategic rationale for growth options under uncertainty and imperfect competition. In a market with strategic competition, investment confers a greater capability to take advantage of future growth opportunities. This strategic advantage leads to the capture of a greater share of the market, either by dissuading entry or by inducing competitors to “make room” for the stronger competitor. As a result of this strategic effect, payoffs are in a rough sense more convex than in the case of no investment in a growth option. When the strategic advantage is strong, increased uncertainty encourages investment in growth options: higher uncertainty means more opportunity rather than simply larger risk. If the strategic effect is weak, the reverse is true. On the other hand, an increase in systematic risk discourages the acquisition of growth options. Our results contradict the view that volatility is a strong disincentive for investment.
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