程式化事实
共谋
代理(哲学)
中介的
执行
业务
逃避(道德)
第三方
集合(抽象数据类型)
产业组织
经济
会计
财务
宏观经济学
互联网隐私
法学
认识论
免疫学
免疫系统
计算机科学
生物
政治学
哲学
程序设计语言
作者
Henrik Kleven,Claus Thustrup Kreiner,Emmanuel Saez
出处
期刊:Economica
[Wiley]
日期:2016-03-08
卷期号:83 (330): 219-246
被引量:369
摘要
We develop an agency model explaining why third‐party information reporting by firms makes tax enforcement successful. While third‐party reporting would be ineffective with frictionless collusion between firms and employees, collusive evasion is impossible to sustain in firms with many employees and accurate business records as any single employee may reveal evasion. We embed our agency model into a macro model where the number of employees grows with development, showing that the tax take evolves as an S‐shape driven by changes in third‐party information. We show that our model is consistent with a set of stylized facts on taxation and development.
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