Crisis and Risk Governance of Cross‐Regional Embodied Carbon Transfers: A Game Theory and Multi‐Agent Network Analysis

ABSTRACT As global carbon neutrality ambitions intensify, cross‐regional embodied carbon transfers via inter‐city trade increasingly pose complex governance risks and crises. Employing an environmentally extended multi‐regional input–output (EE‐MRIO) framework integrated with evolutionary game theory and multi‐agent network analysis, this study critically investigates strategic governance responses to these risks within hierarchical administrative contexts. We introduce a refined carbon accounting approach that explicitly merges production‐based and consumption‐based emissions, significantly enhancing the precision and fairness of accountability mechanisms. Using multiyear data on 313 Chinese cities, we identify critical thresholds in carbon pricing that decisively shape cooperative and non‐cooperative behavior in carbon mitigation. Furthermore, network structure profoundly affects governance outcomes—small‐world topologies rapidly diffuse cooperative norms, whereas scale‐free networks exacerbate vulnerabilities to strategic defection and systemic risk. This research offers robust theoretical advancements by clarifying the roles of strategic interactions, network topologies, and administrative incentives in shaping embodied carbon governance. Practically, we provide actionable policy interventions for mitigating systemic inefficiencies and resolving equity challenges linked to carbon leakage, trade‐induced risks, and regional crises. By combining theoretical rigor with policy‐oriented insights, our integrated methodological approach sets a precedent for effective and equitable climate risk governance, broadly adaptable beyond China's specific context.