介绍
医疗保健
业务
医疗急救
医疗保健产业
医学
运营管理
病人护理
卫生服务
医疗保健服务
作者
Xiaofang Wang,Chenhe Pan,Yixuan Liu,Guoming Lai
标识
DOI:10.1080/00207543.2026.2642418
摘要
Without professional assistance, patients cannot accurately identify their severity and thus often make inappropriate choice among tiered care providers. Recently, artificial intelligence- based diagnosis (AI-based diagnosis) is widely used to help patients make better treatment choice in addition to traditional financial incentives. In this paper, we develop a strategic queueing model, where a low-level provider (GP) may refer patients to a high-level provider (SP) and the patients can strategically choose where to go for initial treatment after seeking AI advice. We find that the common practice of discounting the SP's treatment fees for referred patients may not be able to close the social welfare gap between market equilibrium and social optimum while this gap can always be closed by adjusting the SP's treatment fees together with such referral discounts. Moreover, social welfare can be improved by increasing the AI diagnostic accuracy. This effect becomes more significant when the GP has a higher error probability of treating a truly severe patient but may be less significant when the GP is more likely to refer a truly non-severe patient, depending on the SP's capacity. Finally, the two-tier healthcare system may be worse off using AI-based diagnosis under some circumstances.
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