Aerial Operations Against the Peking–Hankou Railway During Operation Ichi-Go

Abstract During Operation Ichi-Go, the Peking–Hankou Railway’s Yellow River Bridge emerged as a critical strategic asset whose control directly influenced Japanese logistics in North China. Between April and December 1944, the Chinese–American Composite Wing ( CACW ) and the USAAF 14th Air Force executed a sustained air interdiction campaign to disrupt this key transport artery. While limited in scale – comprising only 61 bomber and 160 fighter sorties – the operation inflicted disproportionate damage by targeting not only the railway bridge but also secondary transport nodes such as Kaifeng, Xinyang, and Xinzheng. This campaign complicated Japanese offensives by creating persistent logistical bottlenecks. Drawing from multinational archival sources, this paper examines why the Allies prioritized this bridge, how operational constraints shaped their tactics, and how coordination evolved between Chinese Nationalist Air Force and USAAF leadership. The paper argues that although the bridge was never permanently destroyed, the campaign revealed the growing capability of joint Sino-American air power to execute precision interdiction under resource constraints. Ultimately, the disruption forced Japanese forces to divert critical resources and adjust their strategic planning, thereby shaping the trajectory of the Ichi-Go campaign. This study contributes to a deeper understanding of coalition airpower and logistics disruption in the China Theater of World War II .