微分博弈
构造(python库)
差速器(机械装置)
控制(管理)
污染
计算机科学
数学优化
生态学
数学
工程类
人工智能
生物
航空航天工程
程序设计语言
作者
Zuliang Lu,Fei Cai,Jian Yang,Ruixiang Xu,Lu Xing
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.apm.2022.09.013
摘要
Emission permits are widely used as a policy tool to combat environmental change and regulators sometimes allow emission permits for inter-temporal banking and borrowing so that companies can respond flexibly to market uncertainties. In this paper, we apply inter-temporal transfer of emission permits to transboundary pollution for the first time, construct a transboundary pollution model based on differential game theory, and spatial dimensions are taken into account at the same time. Our findings indicate if the underlying cost fluctuation is sufficiently large, then the regulator should ban inter-temporal banking and borrowing under the noncooperative and cooperative model. In contrast, our findings also suggest that the region with geographical advantage can exert this advantage under the noncooperative model, but the region with geographical advantage loses this advantage under the cooperative model. Moreover, when should the regulators allow or prohibit the inter-temporal transfer of emission permits is not affected by whether regulators cooperate with each other.
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