谈判
动态定价
收入
业务
步伐
要价
微观经济学
结果(博弈论)
价格歧视
议价能力
限价
收益管理
营销
经济
价格水平
财务
凯恩斯经济学
法学
地理
政治学
大地测量学
作者
Chia-Wei Kuo,Hyun‐Soo Ahn,Göker Aydın
出处
期刊:Operations Research
[Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences]
日期:2011-07-13
卷期号:59 (4): 882-897
被引量:64
标识
DOI:10.1287/opre.1100.0903
摘要
Although take-it-or-leave-it pricing is the main mode of operation for many retailers, a number of retailers discreetly allow price negotiation when some haggle-prone customers ask for a bargain. At these retailers, the posted price, which itself is subject to dynamic adjustments in response to the pace of sales during the selling season, serves two important roles: (i) it is the take-it-or-leave-it price to many customers who do not bargain, and (ii) it is the price from which haggle-prone customers negotiate down. To effectively measure the benefit of dynamic pricing and negotiation in such a retail environment, one must take into account the interactions among inventory, dynamic pricing, and negotiation. The outcome of the negotiation (and the final price a customer pays) depends on the inventory level, the remaining selling season, the retailer's bargaining power, and the posted price. We model the retailer's dynamic pricing problem as a dynamic program, where the revenues from both negotiation and posted pricing are embedded in each period. We characterize the optimal posted price and the resulting negotiation outcome as a function of inventory and time. We also show that negotiation is an effective tool to achieve price discrimination, particularly when the inventory level is high and/or the remaining selling season is short, even when implementing negotiation is costly.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI