业务
竞赛(生物学)
质量(理念)
产品(数学)
对手
激励
产业组织
商业
营销
频道(广播)
微观经济学
经济
电信
统计
几何学
生态学
哲学
认识论
数学
生物
计算机科学
作者
Mushegh Harutyunyan,Baojun Jiang
出处
期刊:Social Science Research Network
[Social Science Electronic Publishing]
日期:2016-01-01
摘要
Conventional wisdom suggests that more intense competition will lower firms’ profits. We show that this may not hold in a channel setting with exclusive retailers. We find that a manufacturer and its retailer can both become worse off if their competing manufacturer and retailer with quality-differentiated products exit the market. Put differently, in a channel setting, more intense competition can be all-win for the manufacturer, the retailer, and the consumers. Interestingly, a high-quality manufacturer can benefit from an increase in its competitor’s perceived quality, e.g., due to favorable product reviews from consumers or third-party rating agencies. In other words, a manufacturer may prefer a strong rather than a weak enemy and the manufacturer can have an incentive to help its competitor to improve product quality or to remain in the market. Furthermore, we show that a multi-product monopolist manufacturer with an exclusive retailer may make higher profits by spinning off a product into a competing manufacturer that has its own retail channel, even without accounting for any proceeds from the spinoff.
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