业务
竞赛(生物学)
质量(理念)
产品(数学)
对手
激励
产业组织
商业
营销
频道(广播)
微观经济学
经济
电信
计算机科学
生态学
哲学
统计
几何学
数学
认识论
生物
作者
Mushegh Harutyunyan,Baojun Jiang
摘要
Conventional wisdom suggests that more intense competition will lower firms’ profits. We show that this may not hold in a channel setting with exclusive retailers. We find that a manufacturer and its retailer can both become worse off if their competing manufacturer and retailer with quality-differentiated products exit the market. Put differently, in a channel setting, more intense competition can be all-win for the manufacturer, the retailer, and the consumers. Interestingly, a high-quality manufacturer can benefit from an increase in its competitor’s perceived quality, e.g., due to favorable product reviews from consumers or third-party rating agencies. In other words, a manufacturer may prefer a strong rather than a weak enemy and the manufacturer can have an incentive to help its competitor to improve product quality or to remain in the market. Furthermore, we show that a multi-product monopolist manufacturer with an exclusive retailer may make higher profits by spinning off a product into a competing manufacturer that has its own retail channel, even without accounting for any proceeds from the spinoff.
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