补贴
政府(语言学)
农业
公共经济学
利益相关者
业务
情感(语言学)
透视图(图形)
博弈论
环境经济学
经济
产业组织
微观经济学
计算机科学
市场经济
生物
语言学
哲学
人工智能
管理
生态学
作者
Yuanyuan Zhou,Zhiyong He,Shuliang Zhao
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.spc.2021.09.014
摘要
In recent years, the environmental problems caused by improper treatment of agricultural residues are becoming increasingly severe. Although the government has established various subsidy policies for agricultural residues recycling, the expected results have not been achieved. Existing literature focuses on the government perspective and lacks analysis of participant decision making. In this study, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government, enterprises, and individuals is established to analyze and participate in decision making from the stakeholder perspective. MATLAB is used for numerical simulation analysis. Results show that when the government subsidizes agricultural residues recycling only for enterprises or individuals cannot achieve the expected results. Rather, government subsidies should consider both enterprises and individuals. At the same time, the amount is one of the keys to the effectiveness of the subsidy. The government needs to establish a scientific dynamic adjustment mechanism to ensure the effective implementation of policies.
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