精英
搭便车
联盟
舆论
搭便车问题
政治学
工作(物理)
国家(计算机科学)
政治经济学
公共关系
公共物品
社会学
法学
经济
工程类
政治
微观经济学
计算机科学
机械工程
激励
算法
摘要
Rational choice theories have claimed that small states exploit their large allies’ defense spending. However, little work has been done on the foundations of free riding at the levels of elite and public opinion. If smaller states free ride, it is unclear whether they are following the expressed wishes of their constituents or something else. Using a novel method for measuring public support for free riding in the Australian candidate and election studies together with Australian defense spending data, this article rectifies the gap. Neither Australian voters nor parliamentary candidates consciously support Australian free riding on the United States, but I find that Australia free rides nonetheless. This suggests that rational state behavior may arise from elite calculation rather than pressure from below.
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