计算机科学
加密
连词查询
对称密钥算法
方案(数学)
密码原语
密码学
计算机安全
外包
理论计算机科学
数据库
公钥密码术
密码协议
数学
数学分析
关系数据库
政治学
法学
作者
Dandan Yuan,Cong Zuo,Shujie Cui,Giovanni Russello
标识
DOI:10.56553/popets-2023-0040
摘要
Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) enables the data owner to outsource its database (document sets) to an untrusted server and make searches and updates securely and efficiently. Conjunctive DSSE can process conjunctive queries that return the documents containing multiple keywords. However, a conjunctive search could leak the keyword pair result pattern (KPRP), where attackers can learn which documents contain any two keywords involved in the query. File-injection attack shows that KPRP can be utilized to recover searched keywords. To protect data effectively, DSSE should also achieve forward privacy, i.e., hides the link between updates to previous searches, and backward privacy, i.e., prevents deleted entries being accessed by subsequent searches. Otherwise, the attacker could recover updated/searched keywords and records. However, no conjunctive DSSE scheme in the literature can hide KPRP in sub-linear search efficiency while guaranteeing forward and backward privacy. In this work, we propose the first sub-linear KPRP-hiding conjunctive DSSE scheme (named HDXT) with both forward and backward privacy guarantees. To achieve these three security properties, we introduce a new cryptographic primitive: Attribute-updatable Hidden Map Encryption (AUHME). AUHME enables HDXT to efficiently and securely perform conjunctive queries and update the database in an oblivious way. In comparison with previous work that has weaker security guarantees, HDXT shows comparable, and in some cases, even better performance.
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