Western Technology and China's Industrial Development: Steamship Building in Nineteenth-Century China, 1828–1895 by Hsien-ch'un Wang

Reviewed by: Western Technology and China's Industrial Development: Steamship Building in Nineteenth-Century China, 1828–1895 by Hsien-ch'un Wang Bert Becker (bio) Western Technology and China's Industrial Development: Steamship Building in Nineteenth-Century China, 1828–1895 By Hsien-ch'un Wang. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. Pp. xvi + 229. Hsien-ch'un Wang's book describes the process of transferring steam-engine technology to China in the nineteenth century and the subsequent impact on Chinese technical education and shipbuilding. It highlights how Chinese senior officials either welcomed or hindered technological innovation and progress. Steamship building depended on government subsidies. The book demonstrates the scientific and technological underpinnings of this transfer process. Wang presents the early attempts to build steamers in China in a very readable and even exciting way, with colorful descriptions enhanced by impressive images. Wang writes that once Chinese officials understood the importance of steam power for military purposes, they recruited European technicians and instructors, starting an education process that lasted until the end of the century. Translating steam-engine management manuals and popularized science textbooks from European languages introduced Chinese readers to new terms and concepts. The Fuzhou Navy Yard serves as a case study illustrating the fundamental problems of transferring Western science to China. The major value of the book is that Wang largely and consistently employs Chinese primary and secondary sources. Furthermore, he compares China's path to modern shipbuilding with the Japanese experience around the same time. His aim is to reject common notions that the Chinese government in its years of decline was too inept to acquire steam technology (as U.S. historian John Fairbank's seminal studies suggest), or that internal socioeconomic or political dynamics or a deep-rooted conservative society (as other historians argue) sufficiently explain China's difficulties handling steam technology. Wang sees China's techno-scientific settings as the major factor impeding technological progress. Before the 1911 revolution brought an end to the Qing dynasty, structural inefficiencies such as the dominance of senior officials making poor decisions, a weak fiscal system, and a lack of funds had prevented major progress in China's shipbuilding industry. Remarkably, Wang addresses the problematic lack of private initiatives that turned the Chinese "age of steam" into a government-sponsored phenomenon. Yet he does not draw the logical conclusion that the manic absolute state control of technical developments was perhaps the main reason why China lost out to [End Page 645] its rival Japan, suffering a humiliating military defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95). Historians interested in the history of science will find much important and useful information in Wang's book on China's knowledge of Western sciences at the time. It is fascinating to read that missionaries were the first to introduce technical books and discover how "collaborative translations" and complicated teamwork between (mostly English-speaking) foreigners and Chinese translators worked in practice. This is described in such a sophisticated and detailed way that the book is also valuable for linguistics experts. Educational historians will learn about the lack of curricula science in China, the establishment of new schools teaching scientific subjects, and individual students pursuing a science education in China and abroad. For maritime and business historians of China, the chapter on the Fuzhou Navy Yard's founding and development is certainly the most interesting. It is well situated in the context of global shipbuilding history, demonstrating the French and British naval schools' diverse influences creating and shaping the Chinese Navy. Wang rejects the notion that the Navy Yard's progress was hampered by Chinese staff preferring civil service to a technical career. He considers government intervention crucial, an assumption that is reinforced when comparing the Fuzhou Yard with the British Royal Naval Dockyards. By subcontracting work to private shipbuilders such as the prominent marine engineering company Armstrong, the British Admiralty stimulated competition, driving private shipbuilders to develop new designs that attracted contracts from the Royal Navy or even foreign governments. Unable to play a similar role, the Fuzhou Navy Yard received insufficient funding from the central government to provide domestic shipbuilders with the financial resources they needed. It is revealing to learn that, from...