再制造
斯塔克伯格竞赛
补贴
原设备制造商
业务
政府(语言学)
供应链
产业组织
逆向物流
环境经济学
干预(咨询)
经济干预主义
公共经济学
经济
微观经济学
营销
计算机科学
工程类
制造工程
哲学
精神科
操作系统
政治
法学
语言学
市场经济
政治学
心理学
作者
Haojun Wang,Jun M. Liu,Lianghua Chen
标识
DOI:10.1016/j.eswa.2024.123680
摘要
The extended producer responsibility system and government intervention are among the essential requirements for constructing sustainable economies. In a closed-loop supply chain consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a third-party remanufacturer (TPR), this paper develops four Stackelberg game models for four modes of government intervention under patent licensing: no intervention, tax and subsidy, tax and subsidy plus eco-design tax deduction, and eco-design tax deduction only. The impacts of the different government interventions on the optimal production decision, social welfare, and environment are analyzed and compared. The results indicate that, compared with no government intervention, government tax and subsidy decrease the supply of new products, increase supply of remanufactured products, and raise recycling rates of end-of-life products; on top of tax and subsidy, the government's eco-design tax deduction can further increase OEM and TPR profits; the environmental impact under different government intervention depends on the ratio of the environmental impacts of remanufactured to new products and the level of eco-design effort. This study provides decision makers (i.e., OEM and TPR) and policy makers (i.e., governments) with new managerial insights on the benefits of eco-design and effective mechanisms to promote it.
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