斯塔克伯格竞赛
供应链
业务
收入分享
利润(经济学)
服务管理
综合后勤保障
供应链管理
服务提供商
服务(商务)
瓶颈
电子商务
人道主义后勤
收入
服务水平
过程管理
产业组织
营销
运营管理
计算机科学
微观经济学
经济
财务
万维网
作者
Yaoguang Zhong,Fangfang Guo,Zhiqiang Wang,Huajun Tang
出处
期刊:SAGE Open
[SAGE Publishing]
日期:2019-07-01
卷期号:9 (3)
被引量:40
标识
DOI:10.1177/2158244019870536
摘要
With the rapid development of e-commerce, logistics distribution has become the bottleneck of its development. It is urgent to study how to optimize the cooperation between e-commerce platforms and logistics service providers. Based on Stackelberg game theory, this research first studies the decision making of two-stage logistics service supply chains consisting of the e-commerce mall and the logistics service provider without cooperative distribution, in which decentralization and centralization are analyzed, respectively. Then, it is extended to the decision making of three-stage logistics service supply chains consisting of e-commerce malls, express delivery companies, and terminal distributors. The results show that the profit, sales volume, and logistics service effort of the centralized decision-making system are higher than those of the decentralized decision-making system, regardless of the two-stage or three-stage logistics service supply chain. Therefore, it is vital to formulate a reasonable profit distribution scheme based on revenue-sharing contract to achieve the cooperation among the partners of logistics service supply chain, so as to achieve a win-win situation in which all of their profits increase. Finally, a numerical example is presented to verify the results, and some issues are proposed for future research.
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