A widely held assumption in empirical research and policy making in capital markets is that increasing enforcement effectiveness improves financial reporting quality. In this paper, we show that it can be detrimental, even if enforcement is costless. We develop an agency model with a productive manager who can also engage in earnings management, an auditor, and an enforcement institution and establish the equilibrium strategies and the optimal management compensation. Financial reporting quality typically decreases if already strong enforcement is further increased. Two effects are responsible for this result: First, enforcement and auditing are complements under weak enforcement, but substitutes under strong enforcement. Because auditing provides incrementally valuable services over enforcement, less auditing reduces reporting quality. Second, earnings management is not necessarily “bad”, but can be “good” if it corrects errors by an imprecise accounting system; mitigating earnings management reduces this corrective effect, which lowers reporting quality. We further show that firm value can either increase or decrease with an increase in enforcement, depending on parameters. Finally, increasing enforcement can increase reporting quality, but destroy firm value.