公正
中国
政府(语言学)
地方政府
威权主义
能力(人力资源)
公共行政
提名
政治学
中央政府
公司治理
业务
民主
政治
法学
经济
管理
哲学
语言学
财务
作者
Deyong Ma,Zhengxu Wang
标识
DOI:10.1017/s1468109914000152
摘要
Abstract We surveyed 2,221 rural residents in twenty towns across ten provinces in China. Structural equation models (SEM) found the quality of government, impartiality of institutions, and authoritarian values among citizens are the three main sources of citizens’ trust in local government. Among various types of recent institutional innovation and government reform, only a type that involves citizens in a formal electoral process, called ‘open nomination and direct election (ONDE)’, significantly improved trust in township-level government. Our models reveal that the movement of power to select local leaders from the hands of upper-level government to local residents erodes the influence of the so-called ‘traditional authority orientation’ among citizens, and enables them to assess trust level according to the competence of the government. Furthermore, elections reduce the trust-generating effect of institutional impartiality as citizens are enfranchised in the ‘input’ process of government, therefore emphasizing ‘outputs’ less.
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