公司治理
校长(计算机安全)
业务
环境治理
公共行政
会计
政治学
计算机科学
计算机安全
财务
作者
Elise Zufall,Tyler A. Scott,Mark N. Lubell,Linda Estelí Méndez‐Barrientos
标识
DOI:10.1093/jopart/muaf015
摘要
ABSTRACT State and federal governments use governance platforms to achieve central policy goals through distributed action at the local level. For example, California’s 2014 Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (SGMA) mandates local policy actors to work together to create new groundwater management institutions and plans. We argue that governance platforms entail a principal-agent problem where local decisions may deviate from central goals. We apply this argument to SGMA implementation, where local plans may respond more to local political economic conditions rather than address the groundwater problems prioritized by the state. Using a Structured Topic Model (STM) to analyze the content of 117 basin management plans, we regress each plan’s focus on core management reform priorities on local socio-economic and social-ecological indicators expected to shape how different communities respond to state requirements. Our results suggest that the focus of local plans diverges from problem conditions on issues like environmental justice and drinking water quality. This highlights how principal-agent logics of divergent preferences and information asymmetry can affect the design and implementation of governance platforms.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI