Mitigating risky sourcing with a responsible supplier in a competitive environment: the implication of product line design and sourcing diversification

We consider the sourcing decisions of two competing firms with a potential responsibility violation risk from a supplier. There are two consumer segments in the market: socially and nonsocially conscious consumers. When a responsibility violation occurs, the socially conscious consumers will not purchase from any firm who sources from the risky supplier. To avoid this potential demand loss, the two firms can consider sourcing from a responsible but more expensive supplier. We develop game theoretical models to investigate the firms' optimal sourcing strategies and examine the effects of product line design and sourcing diversification on firms' incentives to source responsibly. Our study shows that when each firm adopts a single sourcing strategy, as the suppliers' cost difference increases, both of their sourcing choices deviate from the responsible supplier to the risky supplier. Moreover, we find that when the firm sourcing responsibly can determine whether to extend the product line to offer responsible and conventional products, product line design improves both firms' profits and induces them to source responsibly. Finally, we find that when each firm can choose between a single and a dual sourcing strategy, sourcing diversification can be potentially detrimental for both firms and prevent them from sourcing responsibly.