供应链
业务
对偶(语法数字)
背景(考古学)
频道(广播)
信号游戏
产品(数学)
私人信息检索
产业组织
营销
微观经济学
计算机科学
经济
电信
生物
数学
文学类
艺术
几何学
古生物学
计算机安全
作者
Jing Chen,Hubert Pun,Qiao Zhang
摘要
Abstract This article examines the information acquisition strategy of a dual‐channel supply chain, in which a manufacturer sells a product both through a retailer and through its own direct channel. Either the manufacturer or the retailer can acquire demand information from a third‐party marketing research company. The manufacturer first decides whether or not to acquire such information, and then the retailer decides whether or not to acquire information. This setup implies a signaling game (either the manufacturer or the retailer may have private demand information) with an endogenous information structure. We identify conditions under which neither of the firms will acquire demand information, even when the cost of implementation is negligible. We also show that information acquisition can have a negative impact on the retailer, the supply chain, customers, and society. The manufacturer who acquires information always prefers to share information with the retailer, which benefits the retailer. The retailer who acquires information, however, may not want to share information with the manufacturer. The managerial insight of our paper is that firms that have more accurate demand data must develop strategies for the appropriate use of that information, both in their own planning and within the context of their dual‐channel supply chain.
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