把关控制
校长(计算机安全)
介绍
代理(哲学)
医疗保健
激励
质量(理念)
医学
业务
计算机科学
护理部
经济
微观经济学
社会学
社会科学
认识论
经济增长
哲学
操作系统
广告
摘要
We develop a principal-agent model in which the health authority acts as a principal for both a patient and a general practitioner (GP). The goal of the paper is to weigh the merits of gatekeeping versus non-gatekeeping approaches to health care when patient self-health information and patient pressure on GPs to provide referrals for specialized care are considered. We find that, when GPs incentives matter, a non-gatekeeping system is preferable only when (i) patient pressure to refer is sufficiently high and (ii) the quality of the patient's self-health information is neither highly inaccurate (in which case the patient's self-referral will be very inefficient) nor highly accurate (in which case the GP's agency problem will be very costly).
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