金融中介
金融脆弱性
首都(建筑)
金融体系
资本要求
货币经济学
中介的
经济
业务
金融资本
福利
财务
金融危机
宏观经济学
市场经济
历史
考古
激励
人力资本
作者
Vadim Elenev,Tim Landvoigt,Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh
出处
期刊:Econometrica
[Wiley]
日期:2021-01-01
卷期号:89 (3): 1361-1418
被引量:117
摘要
How much capital should financial intermediaries hold? We propose a general equilibrium model with a financial sector that makes risky long‐term loans to firms, funded by deposits from savers. Government guarantees create a role for bank capital regulation. The model captures the sharp and persistent drop in macro‐economic aggregates and credit provision as well as the sharp change in credit spreads observed during financial crises. Policies requiring intermediaries to hold more capital reduce financial fragility, reduce the size of the financial and non‐financial sectors, and lower intermediary profits. They redistribute wealth from savers to the owners of banks and non‐financial firms. Pre‐crisis capital requirements are close to optimal. Counter‐cyclical capital requirements increase welfare.
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