实施
计算机科学
Python(编程语言)
可扩展性
嵌入式系统
软件部署
开源
工业控制系统
数据访问规范
操作系统
开放式平台
软件
控制(管理)
软件工程
人工智能
作者
Nikolas Mühlbauer,Erkin Kirdan,Marc-Oliver Pahl,Georg Carle
标识
DOI:10.1109/etfa46521.2020.9212091
摘要
OPC UA is widely adopted for remote-control in industrial environments. It has a central role for industrial control systems as it enables remote management. Compromising OPC UA can lead to compromising entire production facilities. Consequently, OPC UA requires a high level of security. Major commercial OPC UA implementations have compliance certificates ensuring that their security models obey the specification. However, open-source OPC UA implementations that have wide deployment mostly lack these certificates. In this work, we investigate the security models of the four most commonly used open-source implementations: open62541, node-opcua, UA-.NETStandard, and python-opcua. Furthermore, their scalabilities for the number of clients and OPC UA nodes are also analyzed.
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