业务
供应链
产业组织
供应链风险管理
供应链管理
环境经济学
过程管理
持续性
生产(经济)
可持续发展
风险分析(工程)
商业
作者
Yang Lin,Huiting Lin,Ying-Ming Wang
标识
DOI:10.1080/09537287.2025.2576090
摘要
This study examines decision-making in closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) for power batteries with blockchain-enabled traceability. A bidirectional game-theoretic model in which one traceability level links the forward (sales) and reverse (recovery) sides. The manufacturer leads in a game; the retailer sets price and collection; contract terms are chosen by Nash bargaining. We analyse two implementable mechanisms: R&D cost sharing and sales revenue sharing. The findings show that blockchain supports modest price pass through while increasing market demand and consumer surplus. When traceability costs are high, R&D cost-sharing and sales revenue sharing improve coordination. Bargaining power matters: greater manufacturer power raises feasible shares, while the optimal cost- and revenue-sharing rates decline as price sensitivity and traceability costs rise. These insights provide practical guidance for deploying blockchain in battery CLSCs and support the sustainable growth of the EV industry.
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