股东
衡平法
公司
业务
现金流
控制(管理)
国家所有制
国家(计算机科学)
市场经济
财务
货币经济学
公司治理
金融体系
会计
经济
新兴市场
法学
管理
计算机科学
政治学
算法
作者
Rafael La Porta,Florencio López-de-Silanes,Andrei Shleifer
标识
DOI:10.1111/0022-1082.00115
摘要
ABSTRACT We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI