频道(广播)
炸薯条
旁道攻击
信号(编程语言)
计算机科学
探测理论
电阻抗
电子工程
材料科学
计算机硬件
探测器
电气工程
电信
工程类
算法
密码学
程序设计语言
作者
Luong N. Nguyen,Chia-Lin Cheng,Milos Prvulović,Alenka Zajić
出处
期刊:IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration Systems
[Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers]
日期:2019-07-01
卷期号:27 (7): 1561-1574
被引量:41
标识
DOI:10.1109/tvlsi.2019.2906547
摘要
This paper describes a new physical side channel, i.e., the backscattering side channel, created by transmitting a signal toward the integrated circuits (ICs), where the internal impedance changes caused by on-chip switching activity modulate the signal that is backscattered (reflected) from the IC. To demonstrate how this new side channel can be used to detect small changes in circuit impedances, we propose a new method for nondestructively detecting hardware Trojans (HTs) from outside the chip. We experimentally confirm, using measurements on one physical instance for training and nine other physical instances for testing, that the new side channel, when combined with an HT detection method, allows detection of a dormant HT in 100% of the HT-afflicted measurements for a number of different HTs while producing no false positives in HT-free measurements. Furthermore, additional experiments are conducted to compare the backscattering-based detection to one that uses the traditional EM-emanation-based side channel. These results show that backscattering-based detection outperforms the EM side channel, confirm that dormant HTs are much more difficult for detection than HTs that have been activated, and show how detection is affected by changing the HT's size and physical location on the IC.
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