A Cross-domain Authentication Scheme Based on Zero-Knowledge Proof

This paper proposes an anonymous, cross-domain authentication scheme based on zero-knowledge proof to combat the privacy leakage problem of cross-domain authentication when users in the heterogeneous domain access network services from different trust domains. First, we use the zero-knowledge proof algorithm to make the scheme independent of the trusted third party and realise secure data exchange between the device and the agent server (AS). The AS verifies the identity of the device through the proof that does not contain any private user information that can be reconstructed, which plays an effective role in protecting the privacy of the device. Second, the device submits the proof, which is generated from private device information and public parameter information. It has nothing to do with the trust domain authentication mechanism. Therefore, it can be used for mutual authentication between heterogeneous domains. Finally, we use the characteristics of decentralisation and tamper proof of blockchain technology to ensure the consistency of interdomain message storage and realise cross-domain authentication. Theoretical analysis shows that the scheme meets the security requirements of confidentiality, integrity and availability. The experimental results show that compared with the existing schemes, our scheme is feasible and effective.