计算机科学
强化学习
对抗制
软件部署
脆弱性(计算)
领域(数学)
控制(管理)
脆弱性评估
混合动力系统
攻击面
功率(物理)
控制工程
控制系统
自动频率控制
分布式计算
关键基础设施
人工神经网络
控制器(灌溉)
选择(遗传算法)
电力系统
作者
Zhenyong Zhang,Wei Wang,Mufeng Wang,Haiming Wang,Jichao Bi,Guowen Xu
摘要
With the transition to Industry 5.0, there is a growing demand to deploy highly autonomous and resilient artificial intelligence (AI) systems in critical infrastructures such as power grids. In the field of load frequency control (LFC) in power grids, a hybrid control architecture in which deep reinforcement learning (DRL) controllers coexist with traditional proportionalintegral-derivative (PID) controllers can become a typical deployment model during this technological transition. However, the inherent vulnerability of DRL controllers to adversarial attacks introduces new security challenges in such complex environments: attacks not only affect the DRL-controlled areas but may also propagate to PID-controlled areas through inter-area power exchanges, potentially causing broader system instability. To accurately assess the cascading risks under this hybrid architecture, we propose a physics-constrained adversarial attack framework to simulate realistic threats targeting DRL controllers that can propagate across areas. First, we design and implement three typical hybrid control scenarios, i.e., single-agent DRL, partial-agent DRL, and full-agent DRL. Second, we propose a key-feature selection method based on gradient saliency, and we design an attack strategy that adheres to physical constraints while maintaining stealth and efficiency. Third, to enhance the system’s resiliency, we propose a two-stage active defense strategy highly compatible with the hybrid architecture. Finally, we conduct extensive simulation experiments under three typical hybrid control scenarios to evaluate the impact of the adversarial attack and the performance of the defense strategy.
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