违约
中国
债务
业务
繁荣
新兴市场
金融体系
成熟度(心理)
苦恼
债务危机
货币经济学
经济
财务
医学
环境工程
工程类
发展心理学
临床心理学
政治学
心理学
法学
作者
Sebastian Horn,Bradley C. Parks,Carmen Reinhart,Christoph Trebesch
标识
DOI:10.1257/pandp.20231004
摘要
This paper shows that China's lending boom to developing country sovereigns has largely ended and that debt distress and defaults are increasingly common. Chinese lenders react to this challenge through two main coping strategies: first, bilateral sovereign debt restructurings–typically with maturity extensions but no face value cuts–and, second, rescue loans that allow debtors to avoid or delay default. Low-income countries tend to receive debt restructurings, whereas emerging market countries are more likely to receive rescue loans. We speculate that the differential crisis response is due to the different exposure levels of Chinese state banks.
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