互惠(文化人类学)
困境
属地性
囚徒困境
背景(考古学)
概率逻辑
博弈论
计算机科学
生物
进化生物学
数理经济学
人工智能
社会心理学
心理学
生态学
认识论
经济
哲学
古生物学
作者
Robert Axelrod,W D Hamilton
出处
期刊:Science
[American Association for the Advancement of Science]
日期:1981-03-27
卷期号:211 (4489): 1390-1396
被引量:20514
标识
DOI:10.1126/science.7466396
摘要
Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
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