颞顶交界
心理化
心理学
社会认知
最后通牒赛局
认知
认知心理学
任务(项目管理)
厌恶
心理理论
背景(考古学)
神经经济学
推论
社会困境
社会心理学
前额叶皮质
神经科学
古生物学
管理
愤怒
经济
生物
哲学
认识论
作者
Li-Ang Chang,Konstantinos Armaos,Lotte Warns,Ava Q. Ma de Sousa,Femke Paauwe,Christin Scholz,Jan B. Engelmann
摘要
Abstract Prior studies in Social Neuroeconomics have consistently reported activation in social cognition regions during interactive economic games, suggesting mentalizing during economic choice. Such mentalizing occurs during active participation in the game, as well as during passive observation of others’ interactions. We designed a novel version of the classic false-belief task (FBT) in which participants read vignettes about interactions between agents in the ultimatum and trust games and were subsequently asked to infer the agents’ beliefs. We compared activation patterns during the economic games FBT to those during the classic FBT using conjunction analyses. We find significant overlap in the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, as well as the temporal pole (TP) during two task phases: belief formation and belief inference. Moreover, generalized Psychophysiological Interaction (gPPI) analyses show that during belief formation, the right TPJ is a target of both the left TPJ and the right TP seed regions, whereas during belief inferences all seed regions show interconnectivity with each other. These results indicate that across different task types and phases, mentalizing is associated with activation and connectivity across central nodes of the social cognition network. Importantly, this is the case for both the novel economic games and the classic FBTs.
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