Battery recycling and coordination in information leakage prevention under blockchain technology in a new energy vehicles supply chain

Retired battery recycling and information leakage prevention under blockchain introduction intertwine in the new energy vehicle (NEVs) supply chain, but rare literature has jointly investigated them. Therefore, we characterize the vehicle goodwill under recycling and marketing efforts as well as the automobile demand function with and without blockchain introduction, identify the long-run discounted profits of the manufacturer and retailers in the supply chain, and investigate the Stackelberg differential game equilibrium under four scenarios: no blockchain introduction, manufacturer introduction, manufacturer-retailer cooperative introduction, and cooperative introduction plus wholesale price discounts for preventing information leakage. The results show that the manufacturer can introduce blockchain when costs are below a certain threshold, which increases the recycling rate of decommissioned batteries and improves goodwill, consumer demand, and marginal profits for the manufacturer and retailer; the retailer participation in the introduction of blockchain solves the free-rider problem and reduces the thresholds introduced, but does not affect battery recycling, goodwill, consumer demand, and wholesale and retail prices; wholesale price discounts effectively discourage the retailer from leaking information about the manufacturer and lead to improved profits for the retailer, but results in higher earnings for the manufacturer only when discounts are below a certain threshold.