环境经济学
电
资产(计算机安全)
可再生能源
自然资源经济学
温室气体
套利
工作(物理)
意外后果
储能
环境科学
业务
碳价格
碳捕获和储存(时间表)
碳纤维
电力市场
经济
电力系统
边际成本
排放交易
发电
碳排放税
微观经济学
电价
生产(经济)
储存效率
控制(管理)
结转(投资)
高效能源利用
产业组织
可再生资源
化石燃料
即期合同
作者
Clarisse Dupont,Olga Kuryatnikova,Yashar Ghiassi-Farrokhfal,Derek W. Bunn
标识
DOI:10.1287/msom.2024.1411
摘要
Problem definition: The transition from fossil-fuel generators to renewable energy requires significant growth of flexible resources to manage weather-dependent output variations. Key among these are large-scale storage assets. Although storage is mostly carbon neutral in its direct operations, its arbitrage activities influence the scheduled quantities of other producers, thereby affecting market-level carbon emissions indirectly. This raises questions about the extent of these indirect emissions and how to limit them effectively. Methodology/results: We develop a model to analyze the emission impact of profit-maximizing large-scale storage agents in a competitive electricity market. We derive a tight condition for the worst-case rate of added emissions from a storage transaction. Accordingly, we characterize the minimum sufficient carbon levy to keep emissions below a desired threshold. We support our theoretical findings with numerical studies based on the Dutch electricity market. Our results show that both emissions and the corresponding carbon levy depend on the round-trip efficiency of the storage asset and the characteristics of technologies in the energy mix (e.g., marginal costs, emissions, and capacities). The findings remain robust under uncertainty in demand and renewables. Managerial implications: The framework developed in this work enables market participants and regulators to assess, interpret, and potentially control the unintended carbon impacts of storage asset operations. Several findings are nontrivial and carry important implications for regulation. For instance, we show that counterintuitively, storage assets with higher round-trip efficiency can increase system emissions more—and require higher carbon levies to curb them—than less efficient ones. Additionally, although a carbon levy reduces the worst-case emission rates of a storage transaction, we identify scenarios where the emission impact of a storage agent may rise with higher levies. Notably, the indirect emissions of storage agents are also sensitive to whether solar or wind is the dominant renewable. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2024.1411 .
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