事实上
独立性(概率论)
神话学
经济
凯恩斯经济学
实证经济学
政治学
哲学
法学
神学
数学
统计
作者
Giovanni B. Pittaluga,Elena Seghezza,Pierluigi Morelli
摘要
Abstract In the literature on central banks independence these institutions are considered as being apolitical. In reality, central banks are political actors and their de facto independence changes over time even if their de jure independence remains unvaried. An example of this is the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed), whose de facto independence in the past decades has fluctuated significantly because of the pressures of Congress and the President. To counter these pressures, the Fed seeks support from certain interest groups. The success of this behavior is more likely when the President and Congress represent different political parties.
科研通智能强力驱动
Strongly Powered by AbleSci AI