激励
方案(数学)
博弈论
契约论
微观经济学
业务
风险分析(工程)
序贯博弈
效用理论
计算机科学
经济
合作博弈论
重复博弈
精算学
机构设计
运筹学
不完全合同
风险管理
纳什均衡
非合作博弈
补偿(心理学)
合同管理
订单(交换)
控制(管理)
委托代理问题
作者
Yong-Woo Kim,Byong‐Duk Rhee
出处
期刊:Journal of the Construction Division and Management
[American Society of Civil Engineers]
日期:2026-01-30
卷期号:152 (4)
标识
DOI:10.1061/jcemd4.coeng-17037
摘要
The paper investigates the conventional guaranteed maximum price (GMP) contract’s ability to align the contractor’s behavior with the project owner’s objectives. Our findings reveal that the default form of the GMP contract fails to sufficiently incentivize contractors to take on the risk of innovative technology adoption because contractors naturally seek to minimize risk by adhering to conventional methods. To address this shortfall, we developed an incentive scheme within the GMP framework, motivating the contractor to use their expertise to incorporate advanced technologies. We tested the proposed incentive scheme through a hypothetical case study. By employing a game theory approach, the study accounts for the decision-making behaviors of owners and contractors, both acting to maximize their respective payoffs.
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