摘要
Cyert and March’s classic 1963 work A Behavioral Theory of the Firm proposed that firms will initiate search behavior in order to change their current situation when they have problems, such as a performance that is below their aspiration level, or possess abundant slack, and these processes are known as problematic and slack searches, respectively. The current study examines search behavior with regard to corporate R&D investments, and develops specific hypotheses to investigate how firms adjust their R&D strategy in response to poor performance. It also considers how such adjustments differ for two types of slack resources, an issue that has been neglected in previous studies.
This study examines a sample of Taiwanese firms and draws on the concept of institutional logic to investigate how search behaviors may differ between business-group affiliated and unaffiliated firms. It also consider the moderating role of the divergence between the control exercised by controlling owners and cash flow rights, as this is a common feature of corporate governance among business groups in Taiwan. Our sample includes 274 Taiwanese electronics firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) over the period 1999-2008, and the empirical evidence from this panel data is consistent with our theoretical predictions.
In particular, the results show that when firm’s face performance discrepancies, they will increase R&D investment. However, when a firm faces a severe threat to its survival point, such as bankruptcy, it will need to cut R&D spending. Moreover, the results also show that unabsorbed and absorbed slack have different impacts, positively and negatively affecting R&D investment, respectively. In addition, the results also show that both business group-affiliated and unaffiliated firms will increase R&D investment in response to negative performance feedback, but only business group-affiliated firms will increase R&D activity when facing positive performance feedback. Furthermore, the results also show that only business group-affiliated firms have a greater tendency to invest in R&D when there is unabsorbed slack. Finally, the findings show that the divergence between the control of controlling owners and cash flow rights has a significantly positive moderating effect on R&D strategy when the firm’s actual performance is under its aspiration level. However, the divergence in control and cash flow rights has different moderating effects on affiliated and unaffiliated firms when there is negative performance feedback, with the former being positive and the latter negative. The findings on this work extend the claims of behavioral theory in newly industrialized economies, and identify the important factors that need to be considered in future studies.