特洛伊木马
硬件特洛伊木马
CMOS芯片
计算机科学
集成电路
晶体管
炸薯条
电子工程
嵌入式系统
电子线路
电气工程
电压
工程类
电信
计算机安全
作者
Virinchi Roy Surabhi,P. Krishnamurthy,Hussam Amrouch,Jörg Henkel,Ramesh Karri,Farshad Khorrami
标识
DOI:10.1109/tc.2022.3146217
摘要
This study considers detecting Trojans in circuits using FinFET technology non-destructively, when a golden Integrated Circuit (IC) is unavailable. The method employs short-term aging effects in FinFET transistors and circuit overclocking to induce bit errors at the circuit outputs in conjunction with Machine Learning (ML) tools learning Trojan-free behavior. Short-term aging causes delays along multiple paths in the IC to vary dynamically, causing bit errors at circuit outputs. Overclocking enhances this in FinFET but is not necessary for bulk CMOS technology. We use bit error patterns at the output of the circuit to detect Trojans using an ML classifier trained on simulations of the Trojan-free circuit. The study shows efficacy of the method by using dynamic short-term aging-aware standard cell libraries with FinFET technology that are modeled by considering the dynamic short-term aging of each cell. Trojan detection is robust to chip-to-chip variations. We apply the technique on fourteen Trust-Hub Trojans. Our method detects Trojans with $>$ 95% accuracy. Trojan detection in FinFET technology is more challenging than in bulk CMOS because the voltage range for switching from a high to low value is smaller. Therefore we use overclocking.
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