公司治理
机会主义
业务
诉讼
诉讼风险分析
责任保险
道德风险
精算学
责任
股东
再保险
质量(理念)
信息不对称
会计
财务
经济
法学
激励
微观经济学
审计
政治学
市场经济
哲学
认识论
作者
Stuart L. Gillan,Christine A. Panasian
摘要
Abstract We examine whether information about firms' directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance coverage provides insights into the likelihood of shareholder lawsuits. Using Canadian firms, we find evidence that firms with D&O insurance coverage are more likely to be sued and that the likelihood of litigation increases with increased coverage. These findings are consistent with managerial opportunism or moral hazard related to the insurance purchase decision. We also find that higher premiums are associated with the likelihood of litigation, indicating that insurers price this behavior. Taken together, the findings suggest that coverage and premium levels have the potential to convey information about lawsuit likelihood, and a firm's governance quality, to the marketplace.
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