杠杆(统计)
服务(商务)
服务质量
任务(项目管理)
客户服务
竞争优势
服务提供商
业务
计算机科学
自动化
营销
知识管理
质量(理念)
过程管理
服务交付框架
授权
服务水平目标
外包
客户保留
人力资源
人力资本
服务体系
客户宣传
众包
服务设计
客户对客户
作者
Zhenbin Ding,Yali Zhang,Jun Sun,Mark Goh,Zhaojun Yang
标识
DOI:10.1177/10946705251384692
摘要
Artificial intelligence (AI)-powered chatbots offer a cost-effective solution for customer service, but often fall short in delivering personalized or complex interactions. In response, many merchants invest in AI training and explore human–AI collaboration to leverage the strengths of both automation and human touch. However, this introduces a strategic tradeoff between service quality and operational efficiency. Using a game-theoretic framework, this study examines how merchants can optimally choose service strategies with AI involvement. Our analysis reveals a critical collaboration trap. Contrary to the prevailing belief that increased collaboration consistently enhances service, consumers’ sensitivity to the identity of the service agent erodes profitability, and greater collaboration will worsen this effect by accelerating task delegation to AI, thereby amplifying negative consumer perceptions. Furthermore, the study shows that a moderate-cost collaboration trap emerges: human–AI collaboration underperforms compared to human-only service when labor costs are at intermediate levels. Collaboration yields benefits only when labor costs are either very low or prohibitively high. In competitive markets, merchants can gain a strategic advantage not by enhancing their own service quality, but by capitalizing on rivals’ inefficient AI deployment. These findings challenge the assumption that more human–AI collaboration is always better and provide actionable insights for managing hybrid service strategies and optimizing AI investments.
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