中国
保护主义
提升(金属加工)
经济改革
业务
经济
国际经济学
经济政策
国际贸易
政治学
司法改革
市场经济
发展中国家
结转(投资)
政治经济学
发展经济学
经济体制
作者
Ernest Liu,Yi Lu,Wenwei Peng,Shaoda Wang
摘要
Abstract Court capture in developing countries is pervasive, yet its economic effects remain underexplored. We study a Chinese reform that transferred financial and personnel authority over local courts from local to provincial governments. Exploiting the staggered roll-out, we find a 7.3% decline in local defendants’ win rates against non-local plaintiffs, alongside improved judicial quality. The reform encouraged smaller non-local firms to litigate and attracted non-local investment, potentially raising GDP by 1.9%. Yet favoritism toward politically connected firms and inter-provincial protectionism remain, and centralization itself promotes less qualified judges— revealing both its promise and limits.
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