业务
灵活性(工程)
妥协
数据治理
公司治理
激励
审查
基线(sea)
产业组织
钥匙(锁)
测量数据收集
竞赛(生物学)
结果(博弈论)
营销
综合数据
政策分析
共谋
数据共享
公共政策
1998年数据保护法
干预(咨询)
数据收集
多样性(控制论)
市场失灵
不完全合同
商业模式
公共经济学
透明度(行为)
保密
作者
Yeongin Kim,Seokjun Youn,Kyung Sung Jung,Young Hoon Kwark
标识
DOI:10.1287/isre.2020.0293
摘要
Recent regulatory scrutiny has raised concerns about dominant online retailers’ use of marketplace data to compete with third-party sellers. We examine whether emerging data-use regulations can effectively protect sellers. Our analysis shows that strict restrictions on retailer data access can benefit sellers but may also encourage platforms to respond strategically by changing contract terms, shifting sellers across contractual arrangements, or exploiting regulatory ambiguities. A shared-access policy can offer a more practical compromise by better aligning platform and seller incentives. Importantly, regulatory effectiveness depends on the contractual environment and the platform’s ability to adjust its organizational structure, with these challenges becoming more pronounced under wholesale contracts. Our findings suggest that effective data governance requires more than restricting data access. Regulators should account for contract structure, anticipate strategic platform responses, and establish clearer enforcement conditions that limit opportunities for circumvention and strengthen protection against unfair competitive practices.
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