激励
预订
地铁列车时刻表
付款
背景(考古学)
经验证据
收入
医疗保健
电话
排队论
业务
会话(web分析)
运营管理
实证研究
延期
医学
循证实践
患者满意度
病人护理
医疗急救
精算学
门票
门诊部
营销
药方
卫生服务
护理部
医疗保健系统
调度(生产过程)
工作量
计算机科学
作者
Yichuan Ding,Diwakar Gupta,Shenghai Zhou
标识
DOI:10.1287/msom.2025.0321
摘要
Problem definition: In the context of outpatient care, physicians often decide at the end of a consultation session whether to schedule follow-up appointments for patients with likely future needs. Those appointments are referred to as prioritized follow-up (PFU) appointments. We study mechanisms that encourage physicians to schedule the optimal quantity of PFUs, aiming to enhance continuity of care (COC), minimizing no-shows and late cancellations. Methodology/results: Utilizing both empirical analysis and modeling, this paper examines strategies for enhancing COC within an appointment scheduling framework. It presents empirical evidence indicating that a greater frequency of PFUs is associated with improved COC. Subsequently, a queueing model is introduced that delineates the impact of PFU appointments on revenue generation and COC levels. The model reveals a discrepancy between physician and health system preferences regarding the number of PFUs with doctors inclined to schedule fewer and health systems favoring more. We apply a principal–agent model to examine the optimal decisions of both the clinic (principal) and the doctor (agent). For situations involving symmetric information, we identify a performance-based payment structure that effectively aligns the incentives of both stakeholders. When information is asymmetric, we theoretically compare four distinct contract types and identify the most promising candidate. Managerial implications: Our findings suggest that health systems ought to implement incentive schemes that reward physicians for a higher proportion of PFUs in their appointment schedules. Such rewards are more cost-effective than those based on the aggregate number of PFU appointments. History: This paper was selected as part of the 1RR initiative between the M&SOM journal and the MSOM Society. This paper was part of the 2024 MSOM Service Operations SIG Conference. Funding: This research was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72471244 and 72101102], the Natural Science Foundation of Hunan Province [Grant 2024JJ6536], and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada [Grants RGPIN-2025-05592 and RGPIN-2019-05539]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2025.0321 .
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