Information sharing and procurement strategies in agricultural supply chains under retailer competition

Abstract This study examines the interaction between information sharing and procurement strategies in agricultural supply chains with competing retailers. To do so, we establish a game‐theoretic model consisting of one farmer cooperative and two brand retailers that differ in both brand strength and access to market information. The strong‐brand retailer holds more accurate demand signals, while the farmer cooperative sets the wholesale price, and both retailers decide their procurement quantities either from self‐operated production bases or from the cooperative for resale in the end market. The analysis first explores how different information‐sharing structures affect procurement decisions and supply chain performance, and then derives the optimal information‐sharing strategy under various cost and information conditions. The results indicate that the interaction between information sharing and procurement decisions significantly influences wholesale pricing, order quantities, and profit allocation. When the sourcing cost or signal precision reaches certain thresholds, the strong‐brand retailer chooses to share demand information with the cooperative, while the cooperative decides whether to pass this information to the weak‐brand retailer based on its profit trade‐offs. Overall, procurement and information‐sharing strategies are closely interrelated, and their interaction jointly determines the equilibrium sourcing structure and overall performance of the agricultural supply chain. This study provides actionable managerial insights for farmer cooperatives and retailers on how to align pricing, information sharing, and procurement decisions to enhance competitiveness and achieve mutual benefits.