Strategically Timed Voluntary Disclosures before Conferences: Global Evidence

ABSTRACT This study examines how firms strategically time their voluntary disclosures before attending conferences in the global market. We document four findings. First, conference firms provide more voluntary disclosures of positive news and experience better stock performance in the month before conferences than in the month after. Second, firms that attend low-visibility conferences, have limited conference experience, face greater shareholder pressure, or have less concentrated ownership are more likely to increase their voluntary disclosures of positive news before conferences. Third, non-U.S. firms domiciled in jurisdictions with stronger investor protection and financial institutions are more likely to increase their voluntary disclosures of positive news and experience a stock price run-up before conferences. Finally, positive news disclosures before conferences attract more favorable market reactions to conference presentations and greater analyst following and institutional holdings. Overall, conference firms in the global market strategically coordinate their disclosures to maximize the economic impacts of conference attendance. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G14; G15; M41.