秩(图论)
透视图(图形)
业务
会计
计算机科学
数学
人工智能
组合数学
作者
Qilin Wang,Shuang He,Xiaodong Xu,Jinzhao Liu
摘要
ABSTRACT This study examines the impact of rank‐and‐file employees on corporate fraud. Using the educational levels of employees as a proxy for employee quality, we demonstrate that higher‐quality employees serve as notable deterrents to corporate fraud. This effect operates through two underlying mechanisms: earnings pressure alleviation and monitoring role enhancement. Our findings survive after addressing potential endogeneity concerns. Heterogeneity analysis further reveals that the inhibitory effect of employee quality is more pronounced in firms facing severer financing constraints, weaker CEO power, greater reliance on employees, lower unemployment concerns, and better corporate governance. Lastly, we find that internal employee monitoring substitutes for external mechanisms, while employee stock ownership plans enhance the monitoring effectiveness of employees.
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