Do Voters Value Relief over Preparedness? Evidence from Disaster Policies in Malawi

Growing evidence suggests that voters reward politicians for spending on disaster relief but not disaster preparedness. Yet, we know little about the mechanisms that underpin this pattern. Is it because voters generally value relief over preparedness? Or is it because voters expect preparedness policies to be less effective compared to relief policies? I test both mechanisms using a conjoint experiment in rural Malawi in which participants choose between two hypothetical candidates randomly varying attributes about their preparedness and relief policies. I find that respondents reward relief efforts over preparedness efforts, but they value effective preparedness similarly to effective relief. Additionally, respondents are more likely to reward preparedness efforts if they repeatedly observe that they are effective in mitigating disaster damages. Taken together, the evidence suggests that voters have pessimistic expectations about the effectiveness of preparedness policies but would reward preparedness similarly to relief if it is known to be effective.