I exploit the unexpected passage of the UK Bribery Act 2010 as an exogenous shock to firms’ cost of engaging in bribery to study how unobserved bribes affect firm value. I find that UK firms operating i n regions of the world where the level of corruption is perceived to be high are negatively affected by the passage of the Act, more so if they operate in conc entrated industries and are not already subject to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act through a US cross-listing. Foreign firms that are subject to the UK Bribery Act because they have at least one UK subsi diary are also negatively affected. After enforceme nt of the Act, UK firms expand less into geographic re gions with high perceived corruption level and thei r sales in these regions grow 6 percentage points mor e slowly than sales of continental European firms. Thus, bribes create firm value; local anti-bribery regulation puts affected firms at a competitive disadvantage.