Optimal charging station construction cooperation strategy for competitive manufacturers under government subsidies

Purpose This paper aims to examine the optimal charging station construction cooperation strategy in promoting the use of electric vehicles (EVs) and achieve green and sustainable development, the government has provided subsidy incentives for the installation of charging stations by new energy vehicle manufacturers. At the same time, in practice, many competitive new energy vehicle manufacturers collaborate to jointly build charging stations. Therefore, understanding how the government’s subsidies interact with the collaborative relationships between competing manufacturers is an important issue in the EVs field. Design/methodology/approach By constructing a game theory model, this study explores the charging station construction cooperation strategies of competitive manufacturers, including non-cooperation and cooperation through revenue sharing or investment cost-sharing between both parties. Findings The findings suggest that independent construction suits smaller firms with limited investment capacity, while revenue-sharing collaboration is ideal for firms with diverse business types. Investment cost-sharing collaboration is better for firms with limited capabilities but growth ambitions. From a government perspective, to maximize charging station construction, larger subsidies and encouraging revenue-sharing collaboration among diverse firms are recommended. To prevent market monopolies, promoting investment cost-sharing collaboration between small and large firms is more effective. Originality/value This study provides a correct understanding of the feasibility of the new energy subsidy policies currently implemented in China, particularly offering a theoretical foundation for charging station cooperation strategies.